Abstract-We design polynomial time schemes for secure message transmission over arbitrary networks, in the presence of an eavesdropper, and where each edge corresponds to an erasure channel with public feedback. Our schemes are described through linear programming (LP) formulations, that explicitly select (possibly different) sets of paths for key-generation and message sending. Although our LPs are not always capacityachieving, they outperform the best known alternatives in the literature, and extend to incorporate several interesting scenaria.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the following setup. A source, Alice, is connected to a destination, Bob, over a packet network that can be represented as an arbitrary directed acyclic graph. Alice wants to send a message to Bob, securely from a passive eavesdropper, Eve, who wiretaps an unknown subset of k edges in the network. Each edge i that connects node u to node v corresponds to a packet erasure channel with probability δ i ; when eavesdropping this edge, Eve also receives the packet transmissions of node u with erasure probability δ iE , independently from node v. Moreover, we assume that all legitimate nodes in the network, as well as Eve, causally learn whether v has successfully received the packets u transmits or not; however, Eve does not report which packets she successfully receives.
We propose the first, as far as we know, linear programming (LP) formulation, that explicitly selects paths in the network to maximize the secure message transmission rate. It is well known that the (non-secure) capacity of a network can be described by an LP which allows a natural flow-based interpretation of network traffic. Our work leverages this formulation to implement secure message transmission through a two-phase construction. In the first key-creation phase, Alice establishes a secret key with Bob; in the second message-sending phase, she uses the established secret key to encode and securely send a message. Accordingly, our LP selects two sets of paths (that share the network resources): key-creation paths, that Alice will use to share random packets with Bob (so as to create a secret key), and message-sending paths, that Alice will use to send the encrypted message. We term this end-to-end encryption algorithm (Algo 1). We discuss several extensions of Algo 1, notably Algo 2, that apart from the end-to-end key, also creates and utilizes link-by-link keys for secure message transmission.
The LPs we propose are not optimal, but are still we believe interesting. An example where the LPs are suboptimal is the triangle network, where the capacity was characterized in [1] .
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However, there are also a number of examples where the LPs do achieve the known capacity (such as the two-parallel edges network, and the line network); they outperform the best known alternative in the literature in all the cases that we have tested; and they enable new observations. For instance, over erasure networks, there are cases where the key-sharing and messagesending paths use different edges (while over lossless networks, using the same sets of paths is optimal).
Another attractive attribute of the proposed LPs is their generality: the LPs take as input the erasure probabilities δ i and δ iE at every channel edge i, that can be arbitrary. For instance, with δ i = δ iE = 0 we recover the lossless network case, and the LPs achieve the secure network coding rate (which is the optimal scheme for lossless channels). Moreover, similarly to the max-flow LP, our LPs can be extended (see [2] ) to incorporate multiple sources, edges with costs, etc.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews related work; Section III introduces our notation; Section IV presents the algorithms; and Section V has evaluation results.
II. RELATED WORK
Finding the highest achievable rate of secure communication of an arbitrary network setting is an open research problem. In the special case when the network consists of error-free, unit capacity channels, secure network coding is optimal [3] . For the same problem when the channels are not unit capacity (but still error-free) restricted complexity results suggest the hardness of calculating the secret message capacity [4] , [5] . When the network edges are erasure channels all with the same parameters and channel state feedback, and the paths used for Alice to communicate with Bob are decided in advance, a secure communication achievable scheme is proposed in [6] . In contrast, this work provides schemes for arbitrary erasure channel parameters, and explicitly selects the best paths in the network so as to maximize the achievable rates. For a number of small networks (single channel, V-network, triangle network, line network) with erasures and state feedback, capacity characterization and a linear programming formulation were derived in [1] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] . Our approach in this work is different: instead of schemes tailored to specific topologies, we design schemes that are general and extend to arbitrary network topologies. A preliminary version of LP formulations (a precursor of the algorithm Algo 1) for this problem was presented in [11] .
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND NOTATION
A source s (Alice) wants to send a message W securely to a destination d (Bob), over a directed acyclic graph G = (V, E), where each edge g that connects node u to node v represents an orthogonal discrete memoryless broadcast erasure channel with two receivers: node v and potentially a passive eavesdropper (Eve). We denote by X gi the input to channel g at time slot i = 1 . . . n; and by Y gi and Z gi the corresponding outputs at node v and Eve respectively. We assume that X gi is a length L vector over a finite field F q (in the paper we use the convention that L log(q) = 1). We use as the symbol of an erasure. The broadcast channel is conditionally independent, namely
and
We assume that the source has unlimited private randomness, and that all other network nodes have no private randomness. We also assume public state feedback, that is, each legitimate node sends an ACK (or NACK) so that all other nodes (including Eve) learn whether the packet transmission was successful. We use the notation S i−1 for the state of all the channels before the transmission of the i th symbols. Also the notation I u and O u for the set of the incoming and outgoing edges of node u.
We require security in the strong information theoretical sense, defined next in the same way as in [6] , [8] . We use X Ai , for a set A, to denote the vector (X gi ) g∈A , and X i A to denote the vector (X A1 , X A2 , . . . , X Ai ). Definition. We say that R SM is an achievable secret message rate if for any > 0 and sufficiently large n the following conditions hold for some functions f gi,n (·), W B,n (·). For u ∈ U −{s} and for every g ∈ O u :
and for every g ∈ O s :
where U 0 is the unlimited random source of Alice and where the message W is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , 2 n(RSM − ) }. Bob is able to recover W :
Eve gains negligible useful information by observing V ⊆ E:
The supremum of all achievable secret message rates is the secret message capacity of the network denoted by C SM .
IV. END-TO-END ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM Broad Approach:
The algorithm selects two (possibly different) sets of paths, one set for key-creation and the other for message-sending. The source uses the first (key-creation) set of paths to send random packets to the destination; intermediate nodes forward the random packets they receive from their incoming edges to their outgoing edges using two techniques, ARQ and MDS expansion, as we will describe later in this section. The source and the destination create an end-to-end secret key, based on their shared random packets and an estimate of how many of these Eve has eavesdropped. The algorithm also selects a second set of paths, over which the source sends an information message to the destination, encrypted with the source-destination end-to-end key. Intermediate nodes simply forward the encrypted packets using ARQ. The goal of the program is to maximize the rate at which the message can be send securely to the destination, by optimizing over two things: 1) what are the paths selected for key-creation and messagesending and 2) and how are the random packets forwarded by the intermediate nodes. A challenge in the program formulation is how to estimate Eve's knowledge.
A. Scheme Description and Algo 1 LP
We start from the case where Eve observes any (one) edge of the network. All the LP variables express rate of packets, either message-packets, or random-packets.
Key-creation constraints: The source generates uniform random packets, to be send to the destination. The intermediate nodes collect the random packets they receive from all their incoming edges, partition them into subsets, and send a subset to each of their outgoing edges using two techniques, Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) and Maximum-DistanceSeperable (MDS) code expansion. To capture this, for each edge (channel) g, that connects say vertex u to vertex v, the LP uses three variables s g , k g and r g . Node u sends k g packets to node v, by first multiplying these packets with an MDS code of size kg 1−δgδgE × k g to create kg 1−δgδgE linear combinations, and then transmitting each linear combination exactly once (we discuss later why we expand with these parameters). From these packets, v receives a fraction k g 1−δg 1−δgδgE . Moreover, u also sends to node v r g packets using ARQ; v receives all these packets. Node v receives in total rate s g random packets, with
If node u has I u incoming and O u edges, we have that
This constraint requires that the random packets node u sends are equal to the random packets it receives; that is, intermediate network nodes do not discard or generate random packets. Message-sending constraints: The source encrypts the message using an end-to-end key (we will describe how later), and forwards it to the destination; each intermediate node uses ARQ to forward the encrypted message packets it receives. The LP uses a variable m g to capture the encrypted message packets that node u sends to node v through the edge g that connects them; note that to do so, node u makes mg 1−δg transmissions. We require message flow conservation, i.e.,
Time-sharing (edge capacity) constraints: Random and encrypted packets need to potentially share the network edges (channels); we thus require for every edge of the network that
Security constraints: If Eve is located on edge g, she will overhear a fraction m g 1−δgE 1−δgδgE of the encrypted message flow m g through that edge. A necessary condition for our scheme to be secure is that, this amount of message is smaller than the amount of random packets that Alice and Bob have and Eve does not, i.e., the secret common random packets (this condition is also sufficient for security as we discuss later on). Alice and Bob share j∈ID s j random packets; thus if, from these j∈ID s j packets, Eve has overhead say E g (by observing the random packet flow through edge g), then the security constraint would be:
Conservatively estimating Eve's knowledge E g : Consider again edge g that connects vertex u to vertex v. A conservative way to estimate Eve's knowledge, is to set
That is, calculate the number of random packets that both node v and Eve receive. This estimate is conservative because we assume that all the randomness node v receives eventually reaches the destination (Bob), which is not necessarily true. Indeed, when nodes forward packets using the MDS expansion, we "lose" part of the randomness (from the k g random packets, node u only receives k g (1−δg) 1−δgδgE ). Algo 1 uses this approximation. Message encryption at the source: The LP identifies the rate R at which we can send an encrypted message, and the rates m g of the message that flow through each edge. We encrypt the message using a one-time pad approach and a key of size R, that we create by multiplying the s i packets that Bob receives with an R × s i MDS matrix.
B. Discussion
Why use MDS expansion at intermediate nodes: When the network consists of a single edge, the optimal key-generation scheme has Alice generate uniform at random packets and send these to Bob [8] ; this has the advantage that packets that Eve receives and Bob does not, give no information to Eve about the packets Bob receives. Using MDS at intermediate nodes mimics this effect more efficiently: the observation is that, if Alice sends uniform at random packets, there exist some packets that neither Algo 1 LP with end-to-end encryption and E g approximation Input: Set of erasure probabilities δ g and δ gE Output: Secure message rate and achievability scheme parameters max R, s.t.:
∀g ∈ E :
Bob nor Eve receive; thus in a sense these packets do not serve any purpose. To avoid this, Alice can simply expand the k packets to k 1−δδE packets. MDS combining has the property that Eve cannot learn anything about the packets that Bob receives, from the packets that only she (and not Bob) has collected. This observation and the corresponding proof were provided in [10] .
The LP selects what fraction of the packets to send using MDS, and what fraction to send using ARQ, separately for each edge. ARQ has the advantage that it preserves all random packets, and the disadvantage that Eve learns more about Bob's packets.
Why ARQ for message sending: ARQ is a capacity achieving strategy over erasure channels, as is also erasure coding. However, when we are interested in secure message sending, if we were to take the message, encrypt it with a one-time pad, and then use erasure correcting coding to transmit it to Bob, we would get a worse performance than if we send the encrypted message with ARQ. This is because, with erasure coding, every packet Eve receives gives her new information about the information message; however, with ARQ, she may receive repeated packets, that bring her no new information.
Exact calculation of E g : One method is similar to the standard path-LP formulation of the (non-secure) max flow LP, i.e., the LP that assigns rates to each of the paths that connect a source to a destination. To calculate E g , we associate with each path p a random packet flow s p that captures the delivered random packets through that path from Alice to Bob. We can then calculate how many of the packets Bob receives are delivered through paths that include edge g, and remove the fraction that Eve overhears. This approach has a compact LP form and is illustrated in Algo 2. Although this formulation has exponential complexity, it is also possible to exactly calculate E g in polynomial time (see [2] ). For this, we need to assume that network nodes do an additional operation: every node in the network uniformly at random mixes its incoming random packets before forwarding them towards Bob; we thus ensure that "all packets are treated equally". With this, the problem reduces to calculating, what fraction of random packets that go through a given node, reach Bob.
C. Analysis
Why the scheme is secure: This follows directly by applying Theorems 10 and 11 of [10] and Lemma 4 of [7] [2].
Reduction to secure network coding: By setting δ i = δ iE = 1 for every edge of the network, the solution of the Algo 1 LP gives the same result as secure network coding. Indeed, if we assume that the mincut equals h, selecting h edge-disjoint paths, and using h − 1 of them to send the encrypted message and one to send random packets for key generation, is a feasible solution. From [3] it is also an optimal solution for this network.
Suboptimality: The achievability algorithm we presented is suboptimal, not only because it uses an estimate for E i , but also because it only creates an end-to-end key; we know from the work in [1] , that, to achieve the capacity in some cases, even when the intermediate nodes do not have private randomness, we need to create and explore common randomness they have by receiving the same source-generated random packets, leading to an exponential complexity problem [4] , [5] .
Optimality in some cases: Algo 1 is optimal when Alice is connected to Bob through two parallel channels, and Algo 2 achieves the capacity of the line network [2] .
D. Extensions
Given the framework of Algo 1, we can directly extend it in a number of cases, as is also the case for the max flow LP, albeit at additional complexity cost in some cases. For instance, we can extend it to: (1) Link-by-link key creation (see for example Algo 2); (2) Multicasting to more than one receivers; (3) Eve wiretaps more than one edges (if Eve eavesdrops V edges, E g would be the amount of random packets Eve has collected by eavesdropping on edge g plus V − 1 arbitrary other edges [?]); (4) Multiple sources not collocated transmitting messages to the same receiver (in this case, we can combine random packets across sources to create link by link keys; see [2] ); (5) Having costs associated with edges (similarly to [10] ).
Algo 2 description: In this algorithm the message is encrypted both with an end-to-end key, and a link-by-link key (that is applied and peeled off at every edge). The source again selects two (possibly different) sets of paths, one set for randompacket-sending and the other for message-sending. An endto-end key is created from these random packets. The source encrypts all the packets with this end-to-end key and transmits them appropriately through the message-sending paths.
Furthermore, node u (connected to node v through edge g) may also apply an additional link-by-link key, that node v will remove before further forwarding and potentially re-encrypting Algo 2 LP with end-to-end and link-by-link encryption, and with E g exact calculation Input: Set of erasure probabilities δ g and δ gE Output: Secure message rate and achievability scheme parameters max R, s.t.:
the message. Note that u may send to node v more random packets than what node v can forward to Bob, as these extra packets are still useful to create a larger link-by-link key for edge g. Algo 2 uses all the s g random packets to create the link-by-link key. These packets can no longer contribute to the end-to-end key that will also protect the message m g through edge g, and need to be accounted for. Algo 2 exactly calculates how many of the s g packets reach Bob, through a path flow-decomposition approach. We denote with P the set of all paths in the network that begin from the source, with P all the Alice-Bob paths, and with P −g all AliceBob paths that do not utilize edge g. The LP assigns values to each message-path-flow s p s g = p∈P :g∈p s p . The link-by-link key is calculated as the random packets that pass through edge g and are not heard by Eve,
The end-by-end key is calculated as the random packets that were transmitted to the destination without passing through edge g, p∈P −g s p . Since we are protecting from an Eve at edge g, we are sure that all these packets are secure. Thus the security condition becomes,
(a) Message-sending and key-creation paths can be different: the upper path is used only for message flow, the lower path is shared. We depict the optimal values Algo I has selected.
(b) Line network with N + 1 nodes. The LP selects path-flows for the messages so as to achieve the same s g for all edges g. The optimal choice is the one that maximizes the secure message sending rate.
V. EVALUATION
We used numerical evaluations (through matlab) to solve the LPs over specific configurations where the capacity is known. We verified that:
• Selecting paths helps. The optimal message-sending and keycreation sets of paths in several instances did not share all edges. Such an example is provided in Fig. 1(a) .
• Generating keys using MDS helps. Fig. 2(a) shows the performance we get over a two-hop line network ( Fig. 1(b) with N = 2), when: 1) we allow the LP in Algo 1 to only use ARQ for the random packets propagation to the destination, and 2) we use both ARQ and MDS for the same purpose. The benefits of using MDS in this case are clear. Note that over the line network secure network coding achieves zero rate.
• Algo 1 is suboptimal, Fig. 2(c) compares the performance of Algo 1 with the capacity of the 2-hop line network; when Eve only wiretaps the first channel, and the first channel is better than the second, the optimal strategy uses a link-by-link key; Algo 1 cannot do this -Algo 2 can, and achieves the capacity.
• Using link-by-link keys can help. See previous point.
• We achieve benefits over secure network coding. We compare Algo 1 against using channel coding followed by secure network coding. Fig. 2(b) considers a configuration where Alice is connected to Bob through multiple parallel channels; this is a "worse case" configuration in terms of expected benefits, as the main opportunity to create keys comes from the number of paths (and not erasures), that secure network coding also leverages. The constant benefits Algo 1 offers are exactly due to exploiting the erasures over the edge that Eve wiretaps.
